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TORT LIABILITY
Religious Cult Members and Deprogramming Attempts
Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980)
&
Alexander v. Unification Church of America, 634 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1980)
O NE RECENT development in American culture has been the emergence
of "new religions" or "cults." In opposition, a distinct anti-cult move-
ment has emerged composed primarily of concerned relatives of religious
devotees and led by mental health professionals and lawyers. They contend
that fraudulent misrepresentations induce individuals to associate with
cults and that "mind control" techniques compel them to stay. Because such
techniques allegedly impair the ability of devotees to think for themselves,
anti-cult people believe that "deprogramming" is necessary to counteract
cult indoctrination and to restore cult members to mental and social health.
When parents or their agents seek to "deprogram" their adult children
through the legal power of a probate order, or through extralegal abduction
or physical restraint, far-reaching legal questions emerge. Two recent cases
add to the growing case law in this area. The opinions in Peterson v. Sorlien'
and Alexander v. Unification Church of America' discuss the parameters of
permissible conduct for deprogrammers and parents, the availability of tort
remedies to a devotee in response to a deprogramming attempt, the relevance
of the parent-child relationship and the religious involvement of adult off-
spring in determining tort liability of parents and their agents, the role
of the religious organization supporting the lawsuit, and the availability of
a legal response by deprogrammers.
Peterson v. Sorlien
Susan Jungclaus Peterson joined The Way Ministry in 1973 during
her first year at college. After three years, her parents "concluded that
through a calculated process of manipulation and exploitation Susan had
been reduced to a condition of psychological bondage 3 by The Way.
On May 24, 1976, Susan's father arrived to pick her up at the end
of her college term. Instead of going to the family home, he drove to the
home of Veronica Morgel in Minneapolis. There Susan was met by several
1299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980).
2 634 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1980).
a 299 N.W.2d at 127.
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former members of The Way and by Kathy Mills, a professional depro-
grammer.
Initially, Susan refused to discuss her involvement with The Way. She
lay curled in a fetal position, plugging her ears, crying, and flailing out.
By the fourth day Susan's demeanor had changed. During the next several
days she engaged in friendly conversation and played softball.
She also traveled to- Ohio for sixteen days. Following her return to
Minneapolis, her parents unsuccessfully attempted to arrange a controlled
meeting between Susan and her. fiancee, a Way devotee. After refusing to
sign a waiver releasing her parents. from liability, Susan left the house,
waved down a police car, and returned to The Way.4
Shortly thereafter, Susan instituted a lawsuit against her parents and
others involved 'in the deprogramming attempt. At trial, the jury found
defendants Morgel and Mills liable for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and assessed $4000 and $6000 punitive damages. All of the de-
fendants were exonerated of the charge of .false imprisonment.5 Susan ap-
pealed to the Minnesota *Supreme Court.
The principal issues considered on appeal were: whether the plaintiff's
conduct constituted consent to the alleged false imprisonment, whether
evidence concerning her involvement in The Way was improperly admitted,
and whether the jury was improperly permitted to consider evidence that
The Way was aiding the plaintiff with legal expenses.
False imprisonment is an- intentional tort and consent by the victim
is a complete defense. Consent may -be inferred from conduct.' The court
found that Susan's behavior during the last thirteen days of the deprogram-
ming constituted implied consent. She often went out in public, sometimes
alone, and had several obvious opportunities to contact law enforcement
authorities. The issue was whether Susan voluntarily participated in the
activities of the first three days.' The majority held that the jury could find
that her behavior as a whole constituted a waiver - her later consent overv
coming her earlier protests against the. defendants' conduct.
The dissent pointed out, however, that the cases cited by the court
do not support this position.' The court relied on language from Faniel v.
Sd.
5 Id. at 128.
aSee REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 35, 892 (1965).
7 299 N.W.2d at 128.
8 Id. at 134 (Wald, J., dissenting in part, cofiicurring in part).
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Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co.' regarding conduct which would
"negative [plaintiff's] prior consent and convert her into an unwilling passen-
ger on the trip to her home."1 This, however, refers only to the effect
of the plaintiff's prior consent from that point forward. That is, earlier
consent will not negate later protest. Even if Faniel is read to say that any
objection by the purported victim relates back to the beginning of tortious
activity, it does not necessarily follow that subsequent consent also
relates back. In fact, the positions are contradictory. It cannot be true that
both protest at any point negates any manifestation of consent and consent
at any point negates any protest.
In contrast, the dissent cited People v. White," which, in affirming a
conviction for attempted kidnapping, held that later consent does not relate
back to relieve the defendant of liability for any previous acts. "[Flor con-
sent to be a defense to the crime of kidnapping it must be present throughout
the commission of the offense."'"
Rather than ruling broadly on this issue, the majority in Peterson limited
its holding to deprogramming cases stating that:
When parents, or their agents, acting under the conviction that the
judgmental capacity of their adult child is impaired, seek to extricate
that child from what they reasonably believe to be a religious or pseu-
doreligious cult, and the child at some juncture assents to the actions
in question, limitations upon the child's mobility do not constitute
meaningful deprivation of personal liberty sufficient to support a judg-
ment for false imprisonment.'
In support, the court cited Weiss v. Patrick," a similar action for false
imprisonment in which the plaintiff's Thanksgiving visit to her dying mother
became a deprogramming attempt. The Peterson majority underscored the
reference in Weiss to a "parental right to freely advocate a point of view to
her daughter, be she minor or adult."'" The Weiss finding that there was no
meaningful deprivation of personal liberty was, however, based on disbelief
of the plaintiff's testimony concerning the use 'of force.' The Weiss court
9 404 A.2d 147 (D.C. 1979), In Faniel, the plaintiffs claim of false imprisonment was found
to be unsubstantiated because she was unable to demonstrate that her prior consent was
subsequently withdrawn.
3OId. at 153.
11 53 Mich. App. 51, 218 N.W.2d 403 (1974).
12 Id. at 55-56, 218 N.W.2d at 405. White may be distinguished from Peterson since in White
the court based its holding on the public policy that "the [criminal] offense is not only an
offense against a particular individual but ...is also an offense against society as a whole."
Id. at 56, 218 N.W.2d at 405.
13 299 N.W.2d at 129.
14453 F. Supp. 717 (D.R.I. 1978), agfd mem., 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 929 (1979).
'5 453'E. Supp. at722.
16Id. at- 721.
RECENT CASES
3
Grim: Peterson v. Sorlien and Alexander v. Unification Church of America
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1982
AKRON LAW REVIEW
explained: "Defendants have the right which all citizens have, to peaceably
dissuade Plaintiff of her particular religious views, provided they use no form
of unlawful compulsion to effect their purpose. '
In his dissent to Peterson, Justice Wahl cautioned against tampering
with the first amendment rights to freedom of association and belief and
with longstanding principles of tort law "out of sympathy for parents seeking
to help their 'misguided' offspring."' 8 He argued that parents who disapprove
of the religious beliefs of their adult offspring should have no privilege to
engage in tortious conduct." Justice Wahl suggested that by simply accept-
ing the defendants' subjective conviction that their adult daughter's mind
was controlled as adequate justification for their acts, the court was allowing
a good faith defense to false imprisonment which is improper in the law
of intentional torts.2"
The majority attempted to temper the effect of its holding by concluding
its discussion with the comment, "we do not endorse self-help as a pre-
ferred alternative."" They noted that some courts have permitted the cre-
ation of temporary guardianships or allowed criminal actions against cult
leaders as appropriate methods of protecting children."
Another issue on appeal was the propriety of the trial court's admission
of evidence regarding the plaintiff's involvement in the activities of The Way.
By charging defendants with intentional infliction of emotional distress
and seeking punitive damages, plaintiff placed the state of mind of
17 Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
I8 299 N.W.2d at 133 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
19 id. at 134 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
2 0 Id. at 133, 134 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). Accord, W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 48 (4th ed. 1971). But cf., U.S. v. Patrick, 532 F.2d
142, 145 (9th Cir. 1976) (letting stand the acquittal of a deprogrammer accused of the
criminal offense of kidnapping, where the trial court found that the parents' reasonable belief
that their daughter was in imminent danger constituted the defense of necessity).
The authorities are in disagreement over what constitutes mind control or brainwashing.
See Comment, Deprogramming Religious Cultists, 11 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 807, 811 n. 28
(1978) and authorities cited therein. Justice Otis suggested that if the parents had relied on
a professional (i.e., psychiatric) opinion or on a judicial determination, the parents' opinion
regarding mind control would have been less subjective and more acceptable. 299 N.W.2d
at 136 (Otis, J., dissenting).
21 299 N.W.2d at 129.
22 Id. at 129 n.2 (citing Delgado, Religious Totalism: Gentle and Ungentle Persuasion Under
the First Amendment, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 73-97 (1977)). Appellate courts have not fa-
vored the use of legal process to enforce deprogramming. See Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal.
App. 3d 952, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234 (1977) (former probate statute allowing conservatorship
of property is too vague to be invoked to protect minds); People v. Murphy, 98 N.Y. Misc.
2d 235 (1977) (dismissing criminal charge of unlawful imprisonment; holding that the re-
ligious practices of Hare Krishna do not constitute illegal intimidation and merit protection
by the first amendment). See also Augenti v. Cappellini, 84 F.R.D. 73 (M.D. Pa. 1979)
(complaint of misuse of probate order may support a federal civil rights claim based on
religious discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) (1979)); accord, Rankin v. Howard,
457 F. Supp. 70 (D. Ariz. 1978); Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
[Vol. 15:1
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defendants at issue. For a court to award punitive damages, a plaintiff
must prove that defendants acted willfully, wantonly and maliciously.
Good faith is a proper defense to punitive damages. . . .Therefore,
in determining whether defendants acted with the requisite degree of
malice, . . . defendants' perceptions of The Way Ministry and their
fears for Susan's well-being [were] relevant and admissible."
The court discussed whether the first amendment guarantee of free
exercise of religion should nevertheless restrict such testimony. Although
religious belief is absolutely protected from governmental interference, con-
duct which is religiously motivated may be limited when there is a substantial
public interest.14 The court felt that the testimony was properly limited to
evidence purporting to illustrate defendants' fears about The Way's re-
cruitment methods and Susan's living conditions. The court conceded that
even this evidence may have the effect of prejudicing a jury by bringing out
facts regarding religious beliefs, but noted that the jury was properly in-
structed on the purpose of this evidence. They held that the defendants'
right to defend against the charge of intentional infliction of emotional
distress and to avoid the imposition of punitive damages outweighed any
potential for prejudice."2
This much seems to be an accurate statement of the law. However,
the tone and context indicate a readiness to compromise the first amendment
when a "religious or pseudoreligious cult" is involved. In its statement of
the constitutional law, the court added: "A court may also afford the in-
terest of the religious group less weight if it considers the belief giving rise
to the conduct insincerely held, or if the practice is not central to the group's
system of belief. '2 6 Insinuations that The Way is merely a "pseudoreligious
cult" clearly color the court's analysis throughout the opinion."'
Clearly one may not fraudulently claim a religious justification in order
to gain the protection of the first amendment, and conduct found to be
based on secular considerations which are merely coincidental with unusual
religious beliefs will not be protected.2s But such findings must be weighed
very carefully to avoid basing a judgment on the truth or falsity of a faith.
"The essential characteristic of [first amendment] liberties is, that under
23299 N.W.2d at 129-30. See Annot., 93 A.L.R.3d 1109 (1979) (discussing defendant's
mental state required for award of punitive damages in false imprisonment action).
24299 N.W.2d at 130 (citing Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (upholding a chal-
lenge by Amish parents to a state requirement that children attend high school to age 16);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-403 (1963) (reversing state denial of unemployment
benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused Saturday work)).
25 299 N.W.2d at 130.
26Id. (citing Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963)).
17 See 299 N.W.2d at 133 (Wahl, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28 See 406 U.S. at 215.
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their shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief can develop
unmolested and unobstructed." 9
Another factor clouding the discussion of the admissibility of the
testimony concerning the defendants' perception of The Way's activities
was the court's initial holding, which in effect gave parents a good faith
defense to an intentional tort." It is clear from that discussion that the
court was willing to permit evidence of the defendants' perceptions of the
plaintiff's religious involvement to be considered on the question of liability
for false imprisonment, and not merely on the issues of punitive damages
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.3 1
The third issue on appeal concerned an instruction which allowed the
jury, when assessing the plaintiffs credibility, to take into account whether
The Way was maintaining or financing the lawsuit. The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that such an instruction is "in general . . .unwise," 2 but not
reversible error in this case.
In NAACP v. Button, the United States Supreme Court held that solici-
tation and support of individual causes of action by a group is a legitimate
form of political action protected by the first amendment. 3 The Peterson
court felt that a rule allowing a jury to consider evidence that an unpopular
group supports or may derive some benefit from the lawsuit would ultimately
deter potential litigants from accepting assistance from such groups."
This could cause many individuals to forego their rights to seek redress in
the courts.3"
Nevertheless, the court held that this was harmless error because it
was a small part of instructions which were otherwise good, and because
the plaintiff ultimately received an award of $10,000 punitive damages."
This holding may conflict with the United States Supreme Court's refusal in
Button to accept a lower court ruling which would have limited the applica-
tion of the statute in question without overturning it. "Broad prophylactic
rules in the area of free expression are suspect. . . . Precision of regulation
29 Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (overturning conviction of a Jehovah's Wit-
ness for inciting a breach of peace where others were offended by the content of his public
proselytization).
3oSee text accompanying note 20, supra.
31 See 299 N.W.2d at 133 (Wahl, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32 Id. at 131.
33 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
84 299 N.W.2d at 131.
85 Id. at 135 (Wahl, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
B8 d. at 131.
[Vol. 15:1
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must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious
freedoms.""7
Alexander v. Unification Church of America
Like Peterson, the case of Alexander v. Unification Church of Amer-
ica"1 dealt with complaints about the role which a religious organization
played in a private suit purportedly brought on behalf of an individual
member. These claims are perhaps more properly raised in an independent
action, where they do not color the issue of tort liability for the deprogram-
ming attempt. In Alexander, only the claims of the deprogrammers against
the church were at issue."
The plaintiffs were deprogrammers, suing the Unification Church; its
president, Neil Salonen; and its leader, Sun Myung Moon. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and
the plaintiffs appealed. The appellate court reversed the dismissal and re-
manded the case for trial."0
The complaint contained four counts: One claim for "maintenance,"
two federal civil rights claims, and one for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The court upheld the dismissal of the federal civil rights claims,
but held that the first count sufficiently alleged the tort of abuse of process
and the last sufficiently alleged the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress to warrant a trial on these issues.
41
The first count, labelled "maintenance," referred to an earlier lawsuit
brought by Wendy Helander, a young adult member of the Unification
Church whose parents had sought to have "deprogrammed."'" The count
alleged that the suit had been brought by Ms. Helander in name only;
that the Unification Church was paying all legal expenses and would receive
any judgment granted to Ms. Helander; and that this suit along with
several others maintained by the Church was "part of a general policy
to destroy so-called 'deprogrammers,' and others who had the courage to
oppose the viewpoints of the Unification Church."'"
The court held that the common law tort of champerty or mainte-
37 371 U.S. at 438.
38634 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1980).
39 The devotee's claim against the deprogrammer were brought in a separate suit, Helander v.
Patrick, Civ. No. 77-2401 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 16, 1977).
40 634 F.2d at 673.
41 Id. at 675, 677-79.
4" Helander v. Patrick, Civ. No. 77-2401 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 16, 1977).: -
43 634 F.2d at 675.
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nance 4 was not available but construed the allegations of the first count
as a claim of abuse of process. The gist of this tort is "misusing, or mis-
applying process justified in itself for an end other than that which it was
designed to accomplish.""5 The plaintiffs' allegation that the primary purpose
of the suits maintained by the church was to hamper deprogramming efforts,
and not to recover damages for the church members, supports such a
claim. The fact that the suits against the deprogrammers might be successful
is irrevelent to their claim that the defendants are liable for abuse of process.'
The court seemed to say that the defendants would be liable under
New York law merely for "[procuring] the initiation of a proceeding by a
third party."" Yet if the role of the Unification Church is merely to solicit
and support litigation for damages by individual members which also furthers
the legitimate goals of the church, NAACP v. Button precludes making the
church's actions a basis of liability. 8 However, since the plaintiffs claimed
that the primary purpose of the suits was to hamper the lawful activities of
deprogrammers by forcing them to incur the expense and inconvenience
of legal defense, the court held that they had sufficiently alleged an abuse
of process. 9
The second and third counts in Alexander were civil rights claims
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)" ° and 42 U.S.C. § 1986.1 These statutes
create a cause of action for a private conspiracy to deprive a person or
class of constitutional rights. In Griffin v. Breckenridge, the United States
Supreme Court interpreted section 1985(3) to require "a class-based ani-
mus.".51 In Alexander, the Second Circuit refused to find that deprogrammers
44 "Champerty" is a bargain between a stranger and a party to a lawsuit by which the
stranger pursues the party's claim in consideration of receiving part of any judgment
proceeds. It is one type of "maintenance," the more general term, which refers to main-
taining, supporting, or promoting another person's litigation.
634 F.2d at 677 n. 5.
45 PROSSER, supra note 20, at 856.
"This distinguishes abuse of process from malicious prosecution since the latter applies
only when the party claiming malicious prosecution wins the original lawsuit.
47 634 F.2d at 678 (citing Dishaw v. Wakleigh, 15 A.D. 205, 44 N.Y.S. 207 (1897) and
Bd. of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d 397, 402, 405, 343
N.E.2d 278, 282, 284, 380 N.Y.S.2d 635, 641, 644 (1978) (calling Dishaw "a classic ex-
ample of abuse of process")). However, these cases do not directly support the court's
broad statement.
48 371 U.S. 415 (1963). See supra note 34 and accompanying text; Peterson v. Sorlien, 299
N.W.2d at 131, 135.
4 634 F.2d at 678. Cf. Bd. of Educ. v. Farmingdale Classroom Teachers Ass'n, 38 N.Y.2d
at 405, 343 N.E.2d at 283-84, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 643: "Mhe deliberate premeditated in-
fliction of economic injury without economic or social excuse or justification is an improper
objective which will give rise to a cause of action for abuse of process."
5042 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) (1979).
5142 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976).
52 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971).
[Vol. 15:1
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constitute the kind of class contemplated in Griffin. While some courts have
found discrimination against a religious group to be class-based for the pur-
poses of section 1985(3)," this court refused to hold that the statute's pro-
tection extended to "a group of individuals . . . united by philosophical
opposition to the Unification Church."'" The court cited cases in which a
class defined only in terms of its opposition to another class was held to be
"vague and amorphous"" and "not formed on the basis of any invidious cri-
teria." Thus, while the federal civil rights statutes may provide redress by
cult members for abuses by deprogrammers, they are not a promising source
of redress by deprogrammers for abuses allegedly committed against them
by cults.
The district court dismissed the fourth count, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, reasoning that the maintenance of lawsuits by cult mem-
bers cannot be considered "extremely outrageous" conduct, a requisite
element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in New
York.5" The circuit court noted, however, that the complaint also alleged
"constant surveillance of the plaintiffs, . . . having agents patrol the home
of plaintiffs, . . and . . . other equally outrageous activities."" The
court found these allegations to be "sufficient to survive dismissal of the
complaint."59
In this opinion the second circuit made no ruling on the substance of
the Alexanders' claims. Rather, it required the district court to provide a
forum in which to air certain complaints by deprogrammers against a re-
ligious group, in a way that will not affect the consideration of complaints
by religious devotees against the deprogrammers."0
CONCLUSION
Peterson has troubling implications for young adults whose religious
58 See, e.g., Weiss v. Willow Tree Civic Ass'n, 467 F. Supp. 803, 812 (1979); Rankin v.
Howard, 457 F. Supp. 70, 74 (D. Ariz. 1978); Baer v. Baer, 450 F. Supp. 481, 490-91 (N.D.
Cal. 1978). Contra, Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434, 437-38 (E.D. Va. 1980); Weiss
v. Patrick, 453 F. Supp. 717, 723-24 (D.R.I. 1978), aff'd mem. 588 F.2d 818 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979). See also Comment, Deprogramming of Religious
Sect Members: A Private Right of Action Under Section 1985(3), 74 Nw. U.L. REv.
229 (1979).
54 634 F.2d at 678.
-Rodgers v. Tolson, 582 F.2d 315, 317-18 (4th Cir. 1978) (class defined by the plaintiffs
as those "in political and philosophical opposition to" the town commissioners).
56 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Siegelman, 475 F. Supp. 950, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(class described as "critics of the Church of Scientology").
5' 634 F.2d at 678 (citing Fischer v. Maloney, 43 N.Y.2d 553, 557-58, 373 N.E.2d 1215,
1217, 402 N.Y.S.2d 991, 992-93 (1978)). See also PROSSER, supra note 20, at 56.
58 634 F.2d at 676.
59 Id. at 679.
l0 Id.
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or political beliefs and practices differ from those of their parents. It is
easy for parents to believe that a child who adopts unorthodox beliefs and
rejects loved ones is the victim of fraud and manipulation. Yet, on the
mere good faith belief that their adult child is being psychologically man-
ipulated by a "religious or pseudoreligious cult," the Minnesota Supreme
Court gave parents a license to forcefully restrain their offspring. With barely
a nod to the first amendment, the court allowed an adult's religious involve-
ment to be put on trial to exonerate the parents' tortious conduct.
In contrast, in Alexander, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
addressed- some of the concerns of the Peterson defendants in a manner
which gave due respect to the rights of all people involved by providing a
forum for complaints of deprogrammers against a religious group in a
suit that is separate from the complaints of religious devotees against parents
and deprogrammers.
The first amendment protects persons of all religious and political
beliefs including those which may be unorthodox. If there is a legitimate
basis for the concerns of the parents and other supporters of deprogramming,
communities should devise responses which do not compromise the legal and
constitutional rights of young adults. If parents believe that the judgmental
capacity of a devotee is seriously impaired, they should use legal processes
designed to protect the health of one who is mentally incapacitated without
denying them due process."' Nonideological counselling may be an alter-
native to deprogramming which is both constitutionally more acceptable
and more effective than deprogramming.6 ' Finally, the courts should be open
to permit redress by devotees and religious groups as well as by depro-
grammers and parents when improper conduct takes place.
NANCY GRIM
61See Katz v. Superior Court, 73 Cal. App. 3d 952, 983, 141 Cal. Rptr. 234, 252-53 (1977).
62 See Anthony, The Fact Pattern Behind the Deprogramming Controversy: An Analysis
and An Alternative, 9 N.Y,U. REV. L. & Soc. CHAME 73 (1980).
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